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ABSTRACT
We demonstrate the feasibility of a spoofing attack on the GPS receiver of a
phasor measurement unit (PMU). We formulate the attack as an optimization
problem where the objective is to maximize the difference between the time
offset of the PMU’s receiver clock before and after the attack. Since the
PMU uses this clock offset to compute a time-stamp for its measurements,
an error in the receiver clock offset introduces a proportional phase error
in the voltage or current phase measurements provided by the PMU with a
phase-wrap of 2pi (in practice, the computed maximum receiver clock offset
error is never large enough to induce a phase error that requires a phase-wrap
of 2pi) . The decision variables in the optimization problem are the satellites’
ephemerides, pseudoranges, and the receiver coordinates. The constraints are
cast such that the receiver and satellite positions computed from the solution
of the optimization problem will be close to their pre-attack values to avoid
detection. We show that the spoofing attack is feasible for any number of
visible satellites. Simulation results, in which four and seven satellites are
spoofed, are presented to illustrate the effect of the attack on the phase
measurements provided by a PMU.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The motivation behind this work stems from the current trend of increas-
ing deployment of phasor measurement units (PMUs) across the power grid.
While the integration of this new technology has brought about significant
advances in the stability monitoring and state estimation capabilities for the
power system, it has also been a source of security concern. Specifically,
as these PMUs depend on GPS signals to synchronize their measurements,
they are also susceptible to spoofing attacks. A method for spoofing PMU
receivers that results in maximal phase error while evading detection is for-
mulated and simulated. This introductory chapter provides the background
on PMUs and how they utilize the GPS signals for time synchronization. A
review of relevant research is presented along with the main contributions of
this thesis.
1.1 Background
Under the US-DOE Smart Grid vision and its European counterpart, electric
power systems are undergoing radical transformations in structure and func-
tionality. As such, these transformations are enabled by the integration of
new technologies. One such technology that has received considerable atten-
tion is the PMU, which provides synchronized positive sequence voltage and
phase measurements of a power system in real-time [3]. These devices enable
the power system engineers to directly measure the power system state, al-
lowing for real-time control and monitoring of power flows in the power grid.
While the many applications of PMUs are still under research, some of them
include [4]:
• verification of voltage transformers in a substation
• verification of current transformer polarity and phase
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• verification of state estimator results
• verification of system models, where PMU measurements are used to
obtain system dynamic equivalent models, estimate model parameters,
and analyze wide-area transient stability [5]
• synchronization of fault and disturbance records
Therefore, incorporation of PMUs into the power grid results in more efficient
distribution of power and better fault detection in transmission lines.
1.2 Problem Statement
PMUs use a GPS receiver front-end to derive a time stamp in Coordinated
Universal Time (UTC) for their phase measurements. As such, they are vul-
nerable to spoofing attacks. The GPS receiver acquires signals transmitted
by satellites, decodes each satellite’s navigation data, and estimates the re-
ceiver position and the current time. A spoofing attack on the GPS receiver
can cause a faulty time stamp, which introduces errors in the PMU’s phase
measurements. This thesis focuses on one particular method of data-level
spoofing that introduces the maximal phase error in the PMUs’ measure-
ments. However, assessing the impact of phase error on PMU applications is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
1.3 Related Work
The first comprehensive assessment of the vulnerabilities in the civilian GPS
infrastructure was published a decade ago in a report prepared by the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center [6]. This report concluded that
among the different types of attacks, GPS spoofing is the most pernicious
and difficult to detect. Generally speaking, spoofing attacks fall under two
categories: signal-level and data-level. Signal-level spoofing focuses on caus-
ing the receiver to lose lock to the real GPS signal by overpowering it with
the spoofed signal. One method is to use a GPS simulator to generate a
rogue GPS signal matching the genuine signal’s phase, code delay, and en-
coded data. The spoofer gradually increases its transmission power until
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the GPS receiver locks onto the malicious signal, at which point the victim
receiver is fully under the spoofer’s control [7]. It was shown that such an
attack causes significant errors in the phase measurements provided by the
PMUs. In data-level GPS spoofing, the data of the GPS signals, namely the
ephemerides, are altered in such a way that the receiver using the spoofed
data computes the incorrect location, velocity, or clock offset. The problem
is to determine how to manipulate these data in order to cause interference
while evading detection. This type of spoofing is the focus of this thesis.
The absence of effective countermeasures against civilian GPS receiver
spoofing has been made known to major manufacturers, but little has been
done to address such deficiencies in security [7]. Only recently, research into
GPS spoofing have resulted in several recommendations to counteract such
attacks [8], [9]:
1. Amplitude discrimination
2. Time-of-arrival discrimination
3. Polarization discrimination
4. Angle-of-arrival discrimination
5. Cryptographic authentication
6. Signal strength discrimination
The first two methods can be implemented in software but provide only
a rudimentary defense against spoofing attacks. Polarization and angle-of-
arrival discrimination require multiple antennas to implement and are ineffec-
tive against sophisticated coordinated attacks involving multiple rogue GPS
transmitters. An extensive review of cryptographic techniques is made in
[10]. However, cryptographic methods require significant changes to the cur-
rent GPS signal coding scheme, which is unlikely to happen in the short term
[7]. Recent developments in cryptographic methods that allow for minimal
modifications to the current system include navigation message authentica-
tion (NMA) and signal authentication sequences (SAS) [11], [12], [13]. These
schemes are robust against signal spoofing but provide no security for unau-
thorized signal access. Furthermore, to the author’s best knowledge, civilian
3
GPS receivers have not implemented these techniques at the time this thesis
was written.
In [14], the authors demonstrated a spoofing attack on a PMU and reported
constraints on the velocity and acceleration with which the GPS clock can
be manipulated. The attack hijacks the receiver’s tracking loops and steers
them to modify the receiver’s clock offset as desired. They found that if the
tracking loops are steered too aggressively, the receiver loses lock and the
spoof is readily detected. While the work in [14] employed an attack based
on advancing or delaying each satellite signal, we propose an attack based on
modifying the encoded data without modifying the underlying signal char-
acteristics. As such, we do not expect to be bound by the bandwidth of the
receiver tracking loops, only by the rate at which the GPS receiver incor-
porates new ephemerides and the rate at which the PMU updates its time
stamp based on the GPS receiver. The impact of GPS receiver spoofing on
the frequency monitoring network of the power grid is demonstrated in [15].
The authors showed that alterations to the PMUs’ receiver clock offset can
hamper determination of fault locations and introduce erroneous oscillation
modes in the power system. However, methods to introduce errors in the
receiver clock offsets of the PMUs were not discussed.
1.4 Contribution of Thesis
We investigate the feasibility of a simple data-level attack on the GPS receiver
of a PMU using a GPS simulator. Most of the civilian GPS receivers on the
market today do not have the capability of detecting such an attack. In
addition, the price of a GPS simulator has dropped significantly from as
high as $400,000 ten years ago to around $20,000 today, greatly reducing the
barrier to GPS spoofing [7]. These GPS simulators have also seen significant
miniaturization during this period, which makes a spoofer difficult to locate.
To demonstrate the feasibility of a GPS spoofing attack, we formulate
the attack as an optimization problem where the objective is to maximize
the difference between time offsets of the PMU’s receiver clock before and
after the attack while maintaining the computed receiver location close to
its pre-attack value. We perform the optimization for a given instant in
time, which is when the spoof will be applied. The decision variables in the
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problem are the satellite ephemerides, pseudoranges, and receiver position.
The ephemerides are a set of values broadcast by the GPS satellite that al-
low the receiver to compute the satellite position at a particular time. The
pseudorange is the measured distance from the satellite to the receiver and
is computed by multiplying the signal propagation velocity, c = 299792458
m/s, by the signal transit time, which is derived from the nonsynchronized
satellite clock and receiver clock. Because of the receiver clock offset (which
is responsible for the nonsynchronization), the pseudoranges measured by
the receiver all deviate from the true range by a common amount. In the
optimization problem, the constraints are placed on the decision variables
as required in order to avoid spoofing detection. Methods of attack are pre-
sented for four-satellite and seven-satellite cases. For the specific spoofing
attack simulation presented in this thesis, it is shown that the error intro-
duced in the receiver clock offset can be as high as 2.3 ms, which corresponds
to 14% of a cycle in a 60-Hz signal.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we
describe the algorithm that a GPS receiver uses to compute its position and
time offset. In Chapter 3, we formulate the attack as an optimization prob-
lem for finding the maximum receiver clock offset for an arbitrary number of
visible satellites. Chapter 4 presents the results of two simulated spoofing at-
tacks for the four-satellite and seven-satellite cases. Chapter 5 describes ideas
for designing systems to detect and hinder such attacks. Finally, concluding
remarks are made in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
CALCULATION OF RECEIVER POSITION
In this chapter, we explain how a GPS receiver computes its position and
clock offset given the satellite ephemerides and pseudoranges. The relation
between the satellite ephemerides and satellite position is also explained. In
subsequent developments, an overline above a symbol denotes vectors and
a superscript star denotes the pre-attack value of some real-valued variable;
i.e., δ is a vector and x∗ is the pre-attack value of x.
2.1 GPS Receiver Position and Time Synchronization
Error Calculation
A GPS receiver determines its distance from a satellite by measuring the time
of signal transmission from the satellite to the receiver and multiplying that
by the speed of the signal propagation, which is assumed to be the speed of
light. Given the satellites’ positions and their ranges from the receiver, the
receiver location could be computed through a process known as trilateration
[1]. In three dimensions, three satellites are needed to determine the receiver’s
exact location, provided that there is no noise in the measurements and
the time between the satellites’ clocks and the receiver clock are perfectly
synchronized. However, in reality the receiver clock has an offset tu from the
GPS time tE of the satellites that arise from internal hardware bias in the
local clock oscillator (note that we use tE to denote the GPS system time at
any particular time). For solvability, it is safe to assume that the receiver
clock offset is constant across all receiver channels [2]. Therefore, we can
express the GPS time as:
tE = tr − tu, (2.1)
where tr denotes the receiver clock time. The coordinated universal time
(UTC), tUTC , is offset from GPS time tE by an integer number of leap seconds
6
∆tUTC , which is 15 s as of 1 January 2010 [1]. Therefore, tUTC , which is used
for PMU time synchronization [16], is computed as follows:
tUTC = tE −∆tUTC . (2.2)
Figure 2.1 shows a general three bus system with PMUs dispatched at each
bus. A voltage phasor is measured at each bus and time-stamped using the
reference time signal t∗UTC . This time-stamp is common to all three buses
and provides the synchronization of the PMUs’ phasor measurements.
*
UTC
t
*
UTC
t
*
UTC
t
2
31
Figure 2.1: PMU and Associated Phasor Measurements.
With the addition of the receiver clock offset as a variable, at least four
satellites are needed in order to determine the receiver’s Earth-Centered
Earth-Fixed (ECEF) coordinates and the clock offset. The satellite-to-receiver
distance, which is computed by taking the time difference between the satel-
lite clock te and the receiver clock tr and multiplying by the propagation
speed, does not yield the true range between the satellite and the receiver
because of the receiver clock offset. Instead, this measurement is called the
pseudorange, which can be expressed as a linear function of the true range
and the receiver clock offset.
2.2 Four Visible Satellites
For a given time, let ρi and ri be the i
th satellite’s pseudorange and true
range; xi, yi, and zi be the i
th satellite’s ECEF coordinates; xu, yu, zu, be
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the receiver’s ECEF coordinates; c = 299792458 m/s, and tu be the receiver
clock offset. Then,
ρi = ri − ctu, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (2.3)
ri =
√
(xi − xu)2 + (yi − yu)2 + (zi − zu)2. (2.4)
The satellite coordinates xi, yi, and zi are computed by the receiver through
a set of parameters contained in the GPS signal known as the ephemerides
(described in detail below). In the four-satellite case and assuming no noise
in the measurements, the receiver location and the clock offset can obtained
by solving (2.3)-(2.4) directly, as the number of unknowns is equal to the
number of equations. This system of nonlinear equations is solved by the
GPS receiver through a nonlinear solution method, e.g., Newton-Raphson.
2.3 More Than Four Visible Satellites
It is almost always the case that more than four satellites are visible at a
particular instant of time. Then in (2.3)-(2.4), i > 4, which results in an
overdetermined system. In this scenario, the solution xu, yu, zu, and tu is
obtained by solving a least squares errors estimation (LSE) problem of the
form:
min f0 =
n∑
i=1
(ρi − ri + ctu)2, n > 4, (2.5)
where n denotes the number of visible satellites. The GPS receiver solves
the LSE problem in (2.5), which can be solved numerically using the Gauss-
Newton method [17].
2.4 GPS Ephemerides
The ephemerides are a set of parameters that allow the receiver to compute
a satellite’s position at any time. Up-to-date ephemerides are uploaded from
the GPS control segment to the satellites once per day and then broadcast to
the receiver as part of the navigation data signal. A detailed description of
8
Table 2.1: Keplerian Elements
a semimajor axis of ellipse
e eccentricity of ellipse
τ time of perigee passage
i inclination of orbit
Ω longitude of ascending node
ω argument of perigee
the ephemerides and their role in calculating a satellite’s position is presented
next.
The accurate characterization of the GPS satellites’ orbits is essential for
determining the receiver’s position. In the absence of external perturbations,
the trajectory of a satellite is solely governed by the gravitational force of
Earth and can be described by
d2si
ds2i
+
G
s3i
si = 0, (2.6)
where si = [xi, yi, zi]
T is the position vector of the ith satellite, G =
3986005 × 108 m3/s2 is the product of the universal gravitation constant
and the mass of the Earth [1], and si is defined as:
si =
√
x2i + y
2
i + z
2
i .
The solution of (2.6) is characterized by six constants of integration known as
Keplerian elements (listed in Table 2.1), which result from solving (2.6) with
the initial conditions s(0) and ds(0)
dt
. These six parameters allow the receiver
to compute the position and velocity vectors of the satellite at any point
in time given the initial conditions. In order to describe a satellite’s orbit
even more accurately, the additional forces acting on the satellite must be
considered. These forces include the so-called third-body gravitation from the
Sun and the Moon, solar radiation pressure, and the Earth’s tidal variations,
among others. Table 2.2 lists some of the major perturbing forces and their
effects on the satellites. Although the accelerations from the other perturbing
forces are small compared to the gravitational acceleration of the Earth, their
effects do add up to significant changes over an extended period of time.
It is still possible to completely characterize the satellite’s motion under
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Table 2.2: Forces on GPS Satellites and Resultant Accelerations [1].
Force Acceleration (m/s2)
Earth Gravity 0.56
Equatorial bulge 5× 10−5
Lunar/Solar Gravity 5× 10−6
Solar radiation 1× 10−7
full perturbation with the Keplerian elements; however, these parameters will
no longer be constants. A reference time known as the epoch (denoted by t0e
in Table 2.3) is established to characterize the time-dependent integrals of
motion. At the exact reference time, the six Keplerian elements in Table 2.1
describe the position and velocity vectors of the satellite exactly, but as time
progresses the true position and velocity vectors of the satellite will deviate
from the position and velocity vectors computed by the six integrals. In
order to account for these deviations, parameters that characterize how the
Keplerian elements change over time are added to the satellite’s navigation
signal. This expanded parameter set which contains the Keplerian elements
is known as the satellite’s ephemerides and is updated by the satellite every
two hours. The information contained in the ephemerides is summarized in
Table 2.3. A full specification of the ephemerides can be found in [18], which
describes the interface between the GPS space segment and the GPS user
segment.
For completeness, Table 2.4 provides the algorithm by which a GPS re-
ceiver computes the position of a satellite in ECEF coordinates from the
GPS ephemerides. The parameter t used in step (3) of Table 2.4 is the time
at which the GPS signal was transmitted from the satellite. The subscript k
appearing in the computations signifies that the variable is measured at time
tk, the time (in seconds) from epoch t0e to time of transmission t.
To ease notation in subsequent developments, we denote by δi(j) the j
th
ephemeride of satellite i and define δi = [δi(1), δi(2), . . . , δi(m)]
T as the
vector that contains the ephemerides broadcasted by the ith satellite. Using
this notation, we can express the ECEF position of the satellite as a function
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Table 2.3: GPS Ephemeris Data Definitions [2].
t0e Reference time of ephemeris√
a Square root of semimajor axis
e Eccentricity
i0 Inclination angle
Ω0 Longitude of ascending node
ω Argument of perigee
M0 Mean anomaly
di
dt
Rate of change of inclination angle
Ω˙ Rate of change of longitude of ascending node
∆n Mean motion correction
Cuc Amplitude of cosine correction to argument of latitude
Cus Amplitude of sine correction to argument of latitude
Crc Amplitude of cosine correction to orbital radius
Crs Amplitude of sine correction to orbital radius
Cic Amplitude of cosine correction to inclination angle
Cis Amplitude of sine correction to inclination angle
Table 2.4: Computation of Satellite’s ECEF Coordinates [2].
(1) a = (
√
a)2 Semimajor axis
(2) n =
√
µ
a3
+ ∆n Corrected mean motion
(3) tk = t− t0e Time from ephemeris epoch
(4) Mk = M0 + ntk Mean anomaly
(5) Mk = Ek − e sinEk Eccentric anomaly
(6)
sin νk =
√
1−e2 sinEk
1−e cosEk True anomaly
cos νk =
cosEk−e
1−e cosEk
(7) φk = νk + ω Argument of latitude
(8) ∆φk = Cus sin(2φk) + Cuc cos(2φk) Argument of latitude correction
(9) ∆rk = Crs sin(2φk) + Crc cos(2φk) Radius correction
(10) ∆ik = Cis sin(2φk) + Cic cos(2φk) Inclination correction
(11) uk = φk + ∆φk Corrected argument of latitude
(12) rk = a(1− e cosEk) + ∆rk Corrected radius
(13) ik = i0 + (di/dt)tk + ∆ik Corrected inclination
(14) Ωk = Ω0 + (Ω− Ω˙e)tk − Ω˙et0e Corrected longitude of node
(15) xp = rk cosµk In-plane x position
(16) yp = rk sinµk In-plane y position
(17) xs = xp cos Ωk − yp cos ik sin Ωk ECEF x-coordinate
(18) ys = xp sin Ωk + yp cos ik cos Ωk ECEF y-coordinate
(19) zs = yp sin ik ECEF z-coordinate
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δi such that
xi = f(δi, t),
yi = g(δi, t),
zi = h(δi, t),
(2.7)
where the functions f(·), g(·), and h(·) can be defined using Table 2.4.
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CHAPTER 3
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF
ATTACK
In this chapter, we provide the mathematical formulation of the spoofing
attack such that the receiver clock bias offset is maximized. The problem is
cast as an optimization problem where the objective function is the phase
error of the PMU measurements.
3.1 GPS Receiver Spoofing and Impact on the Phase
Information Provided by PMUs
Time synchronization across PMUs is crucial for maintaining an accurate
measurement of phase angles. In the following developments, we assume
that the maximum receiver clock offset from its pre-attack value is not large
enough to cause a phase-wrap in the phase measurement from the PMU.
Therefore, for demonstrating the feasibility of an attack on PMU time syn-
chronization (and phase measurements), we simply seek to maximize the
difference of the receiver clock offset tu (post-attack) with respect to its pre-
attack value t∗u. A GPS simulator can simulate a rogue GPS navigation data
signal and cause simple receivers to latch onto the new signal by gradually
overpowering the true GPS signal, thus forcing the receiver to compute an
incorrect receiver clock offset. For a 60-Hz signal, the PMU’s phase measure-
ment error εθ is related to the receiver clock offset error through the linear
relationship
εθ = [60× (tu − t∗u)× 360◦] mod 360. (3.1)
Figure 3.1 shows the result of a GPS spoofing attack on bus 2 (red) of
the general three bus system. The receiver clock offset tu is shifted from
its pre-attack value of t∗u, causing a proportional error in the estimate of
tUTC . Consequently, the erroneous time-stamp t˜UTC used by the PMU of
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bus 2 results in an incorrect phase estimate, which causes the PMU to lose
synchronization from the rest of the system.
We are interested in determining the maximum phase shift error that can
be introduced in a PMU’s phase measurement by spoofing the GPS signal.
Though many commercial GPS receivers are not secured against spoofing, we
nevertheless employ the following constraints to demonstrate the feasibility of
an attack under simple spoofing detection schemes: i) The difference between
the true receiver location and the location calculated by the spoofed receiver
should be small, and ii) The difference between the true ephemerides and the
spoofed ephemerides should be small. The difference between the pre-attack
clock offset and the spoofed clock offset is maximized. In the optimization
problem, the decision variables are the satellites’ ephemerides.
UTC
t
1
2
3
*
UTC
t
*
UTC
t
Figure 3.1: PMU and Associated Phasor Measurements Post-Attack.
3.2 Four Visible Satellites
In this case, the problem can be formulated as an optimization of the maxi-
mum clock offset error as follows:
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max (tu − t∗u)2
subject to ρi = ri − ctu, ∀i = 1, 2, 3, 4
|xu − x∗u| ≤ εxu
|yu − y∗u| ≤ εyu
|zu − z∗u| ≤ εzu
|δi(j)− δ∗i (j)| ≤ εδi(j), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
xi = f(δi, t)
yi = g(δi, t)
zi = h(δi, t)
(3.2)
where xu, yu, zu are the receiver’s ECEF coordinates, δi are the i
th satel-
lite’s ephemerides. The difference between the decision variables and their
pre-attack values (denoted by *) is bounded by εxu , εyu , εzu and εδi(j). As
discussed above, these bounds are specified to demonstrate that the spoofing
can still succeed even if the receiver checks for abrupt changes to these pa-
rameters from their pre-attack values as a possible countermeasure to detect
spoofing (to the author’s best knowledge, there are currently no commer-
cial products that implement these countermeasures). If the receiver does
not check for abrupt changes in the receiver and satellite positions and the
ephemerides as a way to detect data spoofing, then these bounds can be
relaxed to positive infinity. In addition, equation (2.3) must also be satisfied
as constraints to the optimization problem so that the solutions found are
valid. The expression for tu in the objective function is obtained by summing
the expressions in (2.3) and solving for tu, which results in
tu =
−1
4c
4∑
i=1
(ρi − ri). (3.3)
3.3 More Than Four Visible Satellites
In this case, the system is overdetermined and, assuming noise in measure-
ments, an exact solution to (2.3) no longer exists. Therefore, the constraints
arising from (2.3) are replaced by the LSE condition in (2.5). Since (2.5)
itself is an optimization problem, it cannot be readily stated as a regular
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constraint. However, we can exploit the convexity of the LSE problem [19],
and use the fact that the first-order optimality conditions that the solution
of (2.5) must satisfy are also sufficient conditions, i.e.,
∂f0
∂xu
= 0,
∂f0
∂yu
= 0,
∂f0
∂zu
= 0,
∂f0
∂tu
= 0,
(3.4)
where
∂f0
∂xu
= 2
n∑
i=1
[
(ρi − ri + ctu)(xi − xu)
ri
]
,
∂f0
∂yu
= 2
n∑
i=1
[
(ρi − ri + ctu)(yi − yu)
ri
]
,
∂f0
∂zu
= 2
n∑
i=1
[
(ρi − ri + ctu)(zi − zu)
ri
]
,
∂f0
∂tu
= 2c
n∑
i=1
(ρi − ri + ctu).
(3.5)
The optimization for the maximization of the receiver clock offset when more
than four satellites are visible becomes
max (tu − t∗u)2
subject to
∂f0
∂xu
=
∂f0
∂yu
=
∂f0
∂zu
=
∂f0
∂tu
= 0
|xu − x∗u| ≤ εxu
|yu − y∗u| ≤ εyu
|zu − z∗u| ≤ εzu
|δi(j)− δ∗i (j)| ≤ εδi(j), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
xi = f(δi)
yi = g(δi)
zi = h(δi).
(3.6)
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The variable tu in the objective function can be solved from any of the ex-
pressions in equation (3.5). Solving for tu using the equation
∂f0
∂tu
= 0 yields
tu =
−1
nc
n∑
i=1
(ρi − ri). (3.7)
Note that in the formulation of the optimization problem for more than
four satellites, the constraint (2.3) is replaced by the first order optimality
conditions of (3.4) so as to satisfy the LSE conditions.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDIES
In this chapter, we illustrate the concepts developed in this paper by pre-
senting the results of spoofing a simulated GPS receiver that is receiving
signals from four and seven satellites. The optimization problem described
in Chapter 3 has been implemented in the MATLAB environment with the
perturbation of each of the satellites’ ephemerides limited to ±2% of their
pre-attack values. The pre-attack values (nominal values) of the satellite
ephemerides are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 of Appendix A. The GPS
receiver location is also restricted to vary at most 15 m from its pre-attack
position (see Table A.3 of Appendix A).
4.1 Simulations
For the four-satellite case, the optimization problem in (3.2) is computed for
24 time instances. The solutions for position and clock offset of the spoofed
receiver are plotted along with the corresponding pre-attack solutions in Fig.
4.1. The attack occurs 24 seconds into the simulation. In Fig. 4.1(a), it
is observed that the jumps in the ECEF coordinates of the receiver due to
the spoofed ephemerides are indeed within the 15 m bounds specified by
the constraints. Therefore, if the threshold for detecting an attack is greater
than 15 m, then such spoofing would not be noticed. Figure 4.1(b) shows the
change in the receiver clock offset from the spoofing attack and the resulting
PMU phase angle error corresponding to the attack.
The optimization problem in (3.6) is computed for the seven-satellite case
using the same bounds on the ephemerides, pseudoranges, and receiver loca-
tions as the four-satellite case. The results from the simulation are shown in
Fig. 4.2. The phase angle error resulting from these attacks can be as high
as 52◦, which corresponds to 14 percent of a full cycle for a 60-Hz system.
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(b) Receiver clock offset and phase angle.
Figure 4.1: Receiver Position, Clock Offset, and PMU Phase Error for
Spoofing Four Satellites.
Figure 4.3 shows the receiver clock offset and the resulting PMU phase
error for both the four-satellite and seven-satellite spoofing on the same plot.
Comparing the two plots, it can be seen that the maximum phase errors that
can be introduced under the same constraints for each satellite are nearly
the same.
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Figure 4.2: Receiver Position, Clock Offset, and PMU Phase Error for
Spoofing Seven Satellites.
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Figure 4.3: Clock Offset and PMU Phase Error for Spoofing Four and
Seven Satellites.
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CHAPTER 5
COUNTERMEASURES
In this chapter, some possible countermeasures for GPS receiver spoofing
are described. The methods presented here are by no means comprehen-
sive and as the receiver technology evolves, more sophisticated attacks and
countermeasures are expected to be developed.
5.1 Possible Countermeasures
The simplicity and effectiveness of the attack demonstrated in this thesis
suggest that spoofing detection needs to be employed by PMUs in the power
grid, and in general any high-reliability system using a GPS time stamp. As
described in the Introduction, such detection schemes include [8], [9]:
1. Amplitude discrimination
2. Time-of-arrival discrimination
3. Polarization discrimination
4. Angle-of-arrival discrimination
5. Cryptographic authentication
6. Signal strength discrimination
The attack proposed in this thesis would be easily detected by 4 or 5, but
4 requires multiple networked antennas, and 5 requires changes to the GPS
signal architecture.
Several other simple spoofing detection schemes would readily detect the
attack proposed in this paper. If a receiver is connected to the Internet, it
could download the most recent ephemerides from the GPS control segment
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to validate the received navigation data. Since the proposed attack relies on
spoofing the ephemerides, a cross-check would reveal tampering. Of course,
the spoof would not be revealed until the online ephemeris data were updated,
creating a window of opportunity for the spoofer to cause damage.
Instead of checking against published ephemeris data, the receiver could
compare the received navigation data with the almanac, a reduced-resolution
but multi-satellite version of the ephemerides that is continually broadcast
by every satellite along with its own navigation data. Receivers typically
use stored almanac data upon startup to obtain a quicker fix on all visible
satellites. By comparing a computed satellite position with the position
expected from the almanac, an aggressive spoof could be detected. However,
conservative spoofers could stay below any particular threshold by tightening
the constraints on the optimization problem.
Most GPS clocks do not use the receiver clock offset measurement directly,
but rather use it to guide an independent crystal-controlled oscillator. Mon-
itoring the discrepancy between the oscillator and the computed GPS time
could reveal tampering.
Another spoofing detection scheme takes advantage of the fact that the
genuine satellite signals, while less powerful than the spoofed signals, are
still present. Exact cancellation of the genuine signals would require a com-
plicated spoofer. This technique is known as vestigial signal defense (VSD)
and is described in detail in [20]. VSD is software-based, requiring no extra
hardware. A spoof is detected if additional GPS signals are present in ad-
dition to the most powerful ones. The drawback of VSD is that the buried
signals are hard to distinguish from multipath interference, but if the GPS
receiver is in a static environment (as is the case for PMUs), then multipath
effects could be measured and accounted for.
Finally, the proposed spoof would be easily detected in real time if the
victim receiver were networked to a trusted GPS receiver at another location,
assuming that the trusted receiver is not being spoofed. The victim receiver
need only validate the navigation data, the current GPS time estimate, or
other signal characteristics such as the P(Y) code. The work in [21] shows
that spoofing could be revealed by comparing the P(Y) code on the trusted
and victim receivers. The P(Y) code is an encrypted military code that is
transmitted in quadrature with the civilian GPS code. A spoofed signal
could not contain the genuine P(Y) code.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
PMUs provide synchronized real-time measurements of voltage and current
phasors across the power system. They rely on GPS signals to time stamp
their measurements. As such, these devices are vulnerable to spoofing at-
tacks. One method of spoofing is to introduce an error in the receiver clock
offset, which introduces a proportional phase estimation error from the PMU.
This thesis demonstrates the feasibility of an attack on PMU phase mea-
surements through spoofing the ephemerides’ data on the GPS signal. An
optimization algorithm that maximizes the error in the receiver clock offset
while maintaining the receiver position close to its pre-attack value is pro-
posed. The bounds placed on the maximum receiver position change due
to the attack are to ensure that the spoofing avoids detection. When four
satellites are visible and no noise is in the measurements, an exact solution
to the optimization problem can be found. In the case of more than four
satellites, a LSE solution to the optimization problem is formulated with the
least squares condition recast into a first order optimality constraint. The
feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed spoofing method is demonstrated
through simulations of four- and seven- satellite cases.
Future plans involve extending the domain of optimization from an in-
stant in time to a duration over which the PMU can be potentially spoofed.
Subsequent experimental work includes a demonstration of this attack on a
PMU by building a GPS spoofer (hardware demonstration). The optimiza-
tion algorithm will be used to compute the optimal spoofing method for a
particular time well in advance of the spoofing attack. The solution of the
optimization problem will then be downloaded onto the GPS simulator for
execution at a later time. Given the feasibility of such an attack, the effects
of erroneous phase measurements on state estimation and stability analysis
must be assessed and countermeasures developed.
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APPENDIX A
PRE-ATTACK EPHEMERIDE AND
RECEIVER POSITION VALUES
In Tables A.1 and A.2, we present the pre-attack (nominal values) of the
ephemerides for the four-satellite and seven-satellite spoofing case studies
and the nominal receiver position. For the seven-satellite spoofing case study,
satellites 1-4’s nominal ephemerides are the same as those of the four-satellite
spoofing case study. Table A.3 presents the nominal receiver position before
the spoofing attack.
Table A.1: Nominal Ephemeride Values for Four-Satellite Spoofing.
Satellite
1 2 3 4
t0e 259200 259200 259184 259200√
a 5.15363× 103 5.15371× 103 5.15354× 103 5.15308× 103
e 0.011830 0.005979 0.005346 0.005578
i0 0.925918 0.933421 0.968260 0.957126
Ω0 -1.43155 -1.36401 -2.34350 -1.24484
ω 0.90023 -1.37025 -0.36405 -0.36441
M0 -0.360673 2.106577 2.118746 0.394096
di
dt
−0.4753× 10−9 −0.5003× 10−9 −0.0617× 10−9 −0.4846× 10−9
Ω˙ −0.8712× 10−8 −0.8269× 10−8 −0.8274× 10−8 −0.8089× 10−8
∆n 0.54709× 10−8 0.51577× 10−8 0.48512× 10−8 0.45341× 10−8
Cuc −0.1814× 10−5 −0.2183× 10−5 −0.0430× 10−5 −0.1622× 10−5
Cus 0.83204× 10−5 0.86668× 10−5 0.52582× 10−5 0.95609× 10−5
Crc 1.978437× 102 1.905625× 102 2.819687× 102 1.927187× 102
Crs -35.2812 -41.9687 -14.5937 -26.3125
Cic −0.0502× 10−6 0.0707× 10−6 0.1396× 10−6 0.0856× 10−6
Cis 0.17136× 10−6 −0.03166× 10−6 0.13224× 10−6 −0.00372× 10−6
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Table A.2: Additional Nominal Ephemeride Values for Seven-Satellite
Spoofing.
Satellite
5 6 7
t0e 259200 259200 259184√
a 5.153657× 103 5.153611× 103 5.153715× 103
e 0.0497098 0.00608376 0.0070581
i0 0.940222 0.9702241 0.972953
Ω0 0.811398 1.829237 2.8690143
ω -1.879963 2.882563 -1.140461
M0 1.2627788 -0.1488341 -1.899143
di
dt
0.055002× 10−9 −0.077503× 10−9 0.37287× 10−9
Ω˙ −0.872000× 10−8 −0.808105× 10−8 −0.78260× 10−8
∆n 0.524486× 10−8 0.42926× 10−8 0.43191× 10−8
Cuc 0.11064× 10−5 −0.30063× 10−5 0.066682× 10−5
Cus 0.30100× 10−5 0.81341× 10−5 0.96298× 10−5
Crc 3.085625× 102 2.2546875× 102 2.0253125× 102
Crs 21.4375 -57.625 9.37500
Cic −0.0689179× 10−6 0.0745058× 10−6 −0.10430812× 10−6
Cis −0.0204891× 10−6 −0.0111758× 10−6 0.1341104× 10−6
Table A.3: Nominal Receiver Clock Offset and Position
Xr Yr Zr t0
4.9522459× 106 −3.9473904× 106 −0.7579975× 106 −0.0029999
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